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ABSTRACT
The organizational crisis preparedness includes three components,
namely signal detection, prevention and recovery mechanism. Based
on the Protection and Motivation Theory (Maddux & Rogers, 1983),
a study was conducted among Malaysian manufacturing
organizations listed in the Federation Malaysian Manufacturing
Directory, 2003. Regression analyses on a sample of 106
organizations showed that organizational perception of risk was
negatively correlated with organizational crisis preparedness.
Findings and implications for managerial practice are discussed.
Introduction
Malaysia, one of the world’s top trading nations, must acknowledge the
price it pays for rapid industrialization. It is about time that Malaysia realized
as well as find remedy for the potential damaging side effects of industrial
activities. In fact, Shrivastava, Mitroff and Miglani (1988) aptly stated that
organizations are simultaneously system of production and destruction.
Despite stringent laws and regulations governing industrial activities in
Malaysia, it does not suffice if organizational attitude towards risk and
crisis remains the same as it was during the pre-industrialized days.
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Over the past decade, overseas scholars and researchers have given
much attention in investigating the factors that determined crisis prone
and crisis prepared organizations (Booth, 1993; Fink, 1986; Heath, 1998;
Reilly 1987; 1989, Zdziarski, 2001). Specifically, empirical studies by
Fink (1986), Booth (1993), Chong and Nyau (2002) concentrated on
organizational structures that support or otherwise do not support crisis
management. These studies mainly examined the existence of formal
crisis plan and crisis team in the organizations as determinant of crisis
preparedness. However, Pearson and Clair (1998) did a conceptual study
that proposed looking into organizational perception and attitude towards
risk as a factor that may determine beliefs in the organization about the
value and need for crisis management. But there was no empirical
evidence to confirm or reject Pearson and Clairs’s (1998) proposition.
To add to these, empirical study by Mitroff, Pearson and Harrington
(1996) suggested measures to determine crisis prone and crisis prepared
organizations. Local studies by Shaluf, Ahmadun, Mat, Mustapha and
Shariff (2002) developed model to depict preconditions of technological
man-made disaster in Malaysia. Based on all these studies, this research
seeks to examine the impact of organizational perception of risk, as
proposed by Pearson and Clair (1998) on organizational crisis
preparedness; using measures proposed by Mitroff et al. (1996).
Review of Literature
Organizational Crisis Preparedness
According to Mitroff and Anagnos (2000), Mitroff et al. (1996) and
Zdziarski (2001), crisis preparedness was crisas preparedness is stilll
lackingduring disasters compared to possibilities of crisis that could befall
an organization.defined as the capability to (1) anticipate, (2) prevent,
(3) contain, (4) recover and (5) learn from crisis experience.
Mitroff and Pearson (1993) suggested that crisis-prepared
organizations did not consider crisis management as a cost of doing
business; rather, they viewed it as a strategic necessity that provided a
number of competitive advantages. Executives in crisis-prepared
organizations considered their firms not only as productive systems but
also as potentially destructive systems. They have developed the ability
to imagine the worst, the unthinkable, and the unspeakable, as a way of
doing everything possible to prevent such events. They have indeed
acknowledged the fact that crisis is inevitable.
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Perception of Risk and Organizational Crisis Preparedness
Literatures indicated that organizational preparedness started with
executive’s perception of risk and risk-taking (Paton, 2003; Pauchant &
Mitroff, 1992; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Vries & Miller, 1986). Perceptions
of senior executives determined beliefs in the organization about the
value and need of crisis management (Chong & Nyau, 2002; Mitroff &
Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2000; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992;
Wisenblit, 1989). From the psychological perspective, the Protection
Motivation Theory by Maddux and Rogers (1983) assumed that those
who perceived themselves to be at risk will engage in preventive responses
if they believed that certain responses were available to mitigate potential
damage. According to the cognitive psychological perspective:
Some people see potential crises arising and others do not; some
understand technological and social changes and others do not. What
people can see, predict, and understand depends on their cognitive
structures, by which we mean logically integrated and mutually
reinforcing systems of beliefs and values. Not only do top manager’s
cognitive structures shape their actions, they strongly influence their
organization’s actions (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984: 64).
Thus, if an executive’s cognitive structures did not allow him or her
to acknowledge the organization’s susceptibility to risk and crisis,
preparations will be less likely. There was a fundamental paradox
suggested in connection to crisis management:
The less vulnerable an organization thinks it is, the fewer crises it
prepares for; as a result, the more vulnerable it becomes. Conversely,
the more vulnerable an organization thinks it is, the more crises it
prepares for; as a result, the less vulnerable it is likely to be (Mitroff
et al., 1987:285).
The tragic explosions of space shuttles, Challenger and Columbia
should be enough to dispel any doubts about the validity of this paradox.
Knowing potential vulnerabilities allows planning and organizing. The
end product should be those unpredictable everyday minor crises do not
escalate to become disasters (Davies & Walters, 1998).
An organization that perceived itself as immune to crises will not
allocate resources for that potential and will therefore experience
“surprises” due to lack of anticipation and awareness (Hermann, 1963;
Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). An organization that felt threatened will feel
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more vulnerable to losses and, therefore, may be more prepared to reduce
its vulnerability (Gabor & Pelanda, 1983; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Slovic,
2000). Therefore the first hypothesis developed in the present
investigation is:
H1.a Perception of possible loss is positively related to Organizational
crisis preparedness.
According to Dickson (1987), measurement of likelihood of loss was
an important aspect of the analysis of risk. Probability theory sets out to
attach a numerical value to the measurement of the likelihood of an
event occurring. This probability figure must be between “0” and “1”. A
probability of “0” implied that the event was impossible; while a figure of
“1” showed that it was certain to occur. Clearly there were few, if any,
events which were either impossible or certain and most events therefore
have a probability which lies between these two extremes.
Bannister and Bawcutt (1978) also suggested measurement of risk
was necessary as it provided assistance in practical decision taking about
risk, such as engaging in a business activity and deciding the extent of
adopting risk control measure. According to Bannister and Bawcutt (1978),
to measure risk, we look at 2 dimensions of risk; first, risk frequency, the
other, risk severity and finally relationship between frequency and severity.
Like Dickson (1987), Ansell and Wharton (1992) and Bannister and
Bawcutt (1978) also operationalized assessment of perceived risk based
on estimates of the probability of outcomes and the magnitude of the
outcomes. These were not observable measures; they were the result
of evaluative judgments. In practice there was a tendency to exclude
low probability outcomes on the basis that they were ‘remote’ possibilities
which can be ignored ‘for practical purposes’. They were in effect
accorded an ‘effectively zero’ probability. But the introduction of the
concept of the ‘effectively zero’ possibility brought about the question of
how low a probability needed to be for it to be considered negligible. It
was, therefore, necessary that to include low probability outcomes will
depend on the estimated value of potential losses. Clearly, if the potential
outcome was a possible disaster or catastrophe, which threatened the
very existence of the organization, then it cannot be ignored, no matter
how low the possible value of loss may be (Ansell & Wharton, 1992).
With regards to the relationship between frequency and severity,
Bannister and Bawcutt (1978) suggested that there will be more frequent
minor losses, less frequent serious losses and least frequent rare and
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catastrophic losses. It was, therefore, the executives that will determine
the responses to these probabilities of losses based on their subjective
perception of risk which represented their perceived threat based on
potential value of possible loss. Therefore, the next hypothesis put forth
in the study is:
H1.b Perception of value of possible loss is positively related to
organizational crisis preparedness
Theoretical Framework
Conceptualization of Variables
Based on the discussion in the literature review section, the criterion
variable in this study is Organizational crisis preparedness. The predictor
variable is Perception of risk. The relationship between the study variables
are depicted in Figure 1.
Methodology
Subjects, Procedure and Measurement
This study was conducted in all states in Malaysia. All manufacturing
organizations listed in the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturing (FMM)
Directory (2003) with 40 or more employees have an equal chance of
being selected. The reason for selecting organizations with 40 or more
employees was to reduce bias by ensuring that all organizations that
responded to this study have a safety committee as required by Safety
and Health Regulation1996. Since there are about 1500 manufacturing
organizations listed in the FMM directory (2003), a simple random sampling
is used to select respondents. The respondents were any of the following;
Perception of Risk
• Perception of Organizational Crisis
Possible Loss Preparedness
• Perception of Value
of Possible Loss
Figure 1: Research Framework
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chief executive officers, human resource managers, risk or crisis
managers, safety, health and environment managers or senior
management staff. Since the unit of analysis was the organization, this
study seeks responses from the management staff which were
representative of the organization.
The predictor variable is perception of risk which is based on two
dimensions, namely, perception of possible loss and perception of value
of possible loss. Items for these variables were self-constructed and
responses were made on a 7 point Likert scale. For the first dimension,
the 7 point Likert scale is based on 1= no chance to 7=very great chance.
The second dimension is also on 7 point Likert scale with 1=nil and
7=very great. The criterion variable is the Organizational crisis
preparedness. The items were adapted from measurements proposed
by Mitroff et al. (1996). Responses to the items were made on a 7-point
Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree).
Method of Analysis
Studies by Chong and Nyau (2002), Reilly (1989) and Wisenblit (1989),
Reilly (1987), Shaluf et al (2002), Chaong and Nyau (2002) found that
organizational size, organizational age, hazard category and organizational
ownership were associated with higher ratings to manage crisis. Thus,
this study statistically controlled for these variables. In the present
investigation, the hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression.
Results
Profile of Respondents
The total numbers of respondents were 106 and the demographic
characteristics were shown in Table 1. The respondents comprised of
14% females and 86% males. This gender bias in terms of percentage
representation was indicative of normal gender distribution for senior
management staff in Malaysian organizations. In terms of age distribution,
84% of the respondents were between the age of 31 and 50 years. This
was to be expected as the respondents were senior management
employees who had normally gone through tertiary education and/or had
many years of working experience. With regards to the highest educational
attainment, 76% of respondents were Degree holders, whilst only 17%
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and 5% were Diploma and SPM holders respectively. Hence, it was
safe to assume (in this study sample) that the majority of the senior
management employees were highly educated and only handful were
perhaps rank and file.
Table 1: Profile of Respondents
Demographic Category Frequency Percentage
Variables (n = 106)
Gender Male 91 85.8
Female 15 14.2
Age (in years) 21-30 5 4.7
31-40 51 48.1
41-50 38 35.8
51-60 12 11.3
Designation CEO/ED 11 10.6
General Manager 17 16.3
Senior Manager 59 56.7
Executive 17 16.3
Rank Top Management 45 42.5
Middle Mgt. 61 57.5
Educational SPM/MCE 7 6.6
Attainment STPM/HSC 0 0
Diploma 18 17.0
Bachelor’s Degree 67 63.2
Master’s/ PhD 14 13.2
Looking at the distribution, based on respondents’ designation in the
organization, it was also not surprising that 55% were senior management
employee, whilst only 10% and 16% were Executive Director/CEO and
General Manager respectively. A thorough check on the questionnaires
brought to light that most respondents were production managers/directors
who were more familiar with the procedures and rulings on Safety, Health
and Environmental issue.
Profile of Organizations
As shown in Table 2, the industrial sectors within this study samples
were not evenly distributed. The Electrical and Electronics industry
made up the majority sector, which was 30% of the total study samples,
whilst 10% and 9% were from the Oil and Gas, and the Chemical
industries respectively. The Automobile and the Food/Drink industries
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made up 6% and 8% respectively of the total sample. The remaining
36% comprised of organizations that did not come under any of the
above categories.
Table 2: Profile of Organizations
Demographic Category Frequency Percentage
Variables (n = 106)
Industrial Sector Oil and Gas 10 9.4
Chemical 11 10.4
Electrical/Electronic 32 30.2
Auto Parts 6 5.7
Food/Drinks 8 7.5
Others 39 36.8
Degree of Hazard Hazardous 26 24.5
Non-Hazardous 80 75.5
Ownership 100% Foreign 30 28.31
100% Malaysian 42 39.6
50-50 Joint Venture 2 1.9
Foreign Majority 16 15.1
Malaysian Majority 16 15.1
No. of Employees 40-100 14 13.2
101-200 17 16.0
201-500 28 26.4
501-1000 19 17.9
Above 1000 28 26.4
Years in Business 1-5 yrs 6 5.7
6-10yrs 21 19.8
11-15yrs 25 23.6
16-20yrs 15 14.2
Above 20 yrs 39 36.8
In terms of ownership of the organizations, the majority comprised
of 100% Malaysian owned organizations (40%), followed by 100%
Foreign owned organizations (28%). The remaining 32% were Foreign
and Malaysian joint ownership organizations. As shown, 51% had
operated the businesses for more than 15 years, whilst 44% had operated
the businesses for over 5 years. Only 5% were young organizations that
had been in the businesses between 1 to 5 years.
In line with the distribution based on industrial sector, it was not
surprising that only 25% of these organizations were considered major
hazard organization that were subjected to the CIMAH (Control of
Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulations 1996. This was added
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information that may be useful in further analyses to see if organizations
that were subjected to CIMAH regulation 1996 responded differently
from other organizations in this study.
Hence, the majority of the organizations were mature organizations
that may be better able to respond to this study. It was also worth noting
that the majority of the organizations had employees exceeding 500 people
(44%). With regards to the sales/ turnover, about 62% had sales between
RM10mil to RM200mil per year. Whether organizational size,
organizational ownership, years the organizations were in business and
hazard category formed any pattern in the findings result has yet to be
known in further analysis.
Factor Analyses of Study Variables
Perception of Risk
Principal component factor analyses were performed separately for
each variable. This is to validate whether the dimensionality of the
independent and dependent variables are distinct. In interpreting the
factors, only loading of .50 or greater on one factor and 0.35 or lower on
the other factor are considered (Igbaria et al., 1995).
Perception of Possible Loss.
Factor analysis on the 18 items yielded 2 factors, ranging from .59 to
.89. These factors cumulatively captured 57.55% of the variance in the
data. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value was .86, which was higher
than the recommended value of .60. The Measure of Sampling Adequacy
(MSA) and Bartlett Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance,
thus supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix (Coakes &
Steed, 2001). However, two items were dropped from the analysis due
to low factor loadings (less than .50) and low communality (less than
.40). The reliability (Cronbach Alpha) for factor 1 and 2 were .92 and
.81 respectively, which were considered acceptable. The first factor
was dominated by questions relating to abnormal risks. Accordingly, the
factor was named “Perception of Loss due to Abnormal Risk”. The
second factor was dominated by questions relating to normal risk; hence,
this factor was named “Perception of Loss due to Normal Risk”.
This was in line with earlier studies by Mitroff and Pearson (1993),
Pauchant and Douville (1994), and Pearson and Clair (1998) that risks
were basically categorized into normal and abnormal risk. In this study,
abnormal risks were rare happenings and these included risks that resulted
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from deliberate human action or inaction. Besides being human induced,
abnormal risks also included natural disaster that may lead to catastrophic
losses. Normal risks on the other hand referred to day to day risk that all
manufacturing businesses were exposed to, but may result in disaster if
losses were not controlled or isolated. This included operator error, plant/
equipment defect, product defects and the like.
Perception of Value of Possible Loss
Similarly another factor analysis was also undertaken to examine
the dimensionality of another component, Perception of Value of Possible
Loss. All eighteen items were used to measure the Perceived Value of
Possible Loss. Factor analysis on these items yielded 2 factors ranging
from .64 to .94. All of the 18 items showed acceptable Measures of
Sampling Adequacy values of above .50. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value
for the items was .93 and the Bartlett’s Tests of Sphericity was significant.
The Percentage of Total Variance Explained was 73.97%. Perception
of Value of Possible Loss yielded two factors. Two items were dropped
from further analysis due to low factor loadings (less than .50). The
reliabilities for first and second factors were .97 and .89 respectively.
The common thread across the first factor reflected “Perception of Value
of Possible Loss due to Abnormal Risk” and the second factor reflect
“Perception of Value of Possible Loss due to Normal Risk”. As such
these factors were named accordingly.
Organizational Crisis Preparedness
Factor analysis was also conducted to examine the dimensionality of the
dependent variable, Organizational Crisis Preparedness. This study used
the indicators identified in studies by Mitroff and Pearson (1993). They
proposed four dimensions of crisis preparedness, namely, signal detection,
prevention, damage control and recovery mechanism. Factor analysis
on organizational crisis preparedness resulted in 3 factors with factor
loadings ranging from .50 to .90. The KMO Measure of Sampling
Adequacy (MSA) was .91, whilst the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was
significant. The first factor was dominated by questions pertaining to
“Prevention Mechanism”, the second factor was dominated by questions
pertaining to “Recovery Mechanism” and the third factor was dominated
by questions pertaining to “Signal Detection Mechanism”. Even though
4 factors were suggested in previous studies, 3 factors emerged and it
looked like “Damage Control Mechanism” was subsumed under
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“Prevention Mechanism”. This may be due to the fact that perhaps our
Malaysian organizations did not see prevention and damage control
mechanism as two separate mechanisms and hence considered both
mechanisms as similar. The total variances explained jointly by these
three factors were 67.70%. Finally, the Second-Order factor analysis
was conducted. The result showed that one factor emerged with factor
loading ranging from .80 to .91. This factor captured 75.43% of the
variance in the data and it was named Organizational Crisis Preparedness.
The Cronbach Alpha was .83, the Measure of Sampling Adequacy was
.69 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant. The second order
factor analysis was conducted to gauge the crisis preparedness of the
organizations in the study sample.
As a result, new variables were created after factor analyses, new
hypotheses were constructed which were referred to throughout this
study from this point onwards (Table 3).
Restatement of Hypotheses
Table 3:Restated Hypotheses
Hypothesis
H1 There is a positive relationship between perception of risk and
organizational crisis preparedness.
H1(a) There is a positive relationship between perception of possible loss
due to abnormal risk and the organizational crisis preparedness.
H1(b) There is a positive relationship between perception of possible loss
due to normal risk and the organizational crisis preparedness.
H1(c) There is a positive relationship between perceived value of possible
loss due to abnormal risk and the organizational crisis preparedness.
H1(d) There is a positive relationship between perceived value of possible
loss due to normal risk and the organizational crisis preparedness.
Descriptive Statistics
To acquire a feel for data, descriptive statistics such as the frequency
distributions, maximum, minimum, mean and standard deviation on all
independent and dependent variables were obtained. Table 4 displayed
the results of the descriptive analysis.
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The results in Table 4 indicated that the mean of all variables were
between 2.70 and 5.43. This indicated that there were no extreme values
for the mean. The standard deviations showed variations in the data for
identification of patterns of interrelationship among variables.
In general, the management of manufacturing organizations believed
that losses due to normal and abnormal risk (as specified in the study)
were highly unlikely. They even perceived that if those risks were realized,
the value of loss to the organization were moderate. This provided
indication that organizations believed that they were invulnerable to losses.
The same result was found in studies done in the late 1980’s in the
United States on Fortune 500 organizations in United States (Mitroff et
al., 1989). Despite denying vulnerability to crisis, these organizations
believed that they were ready to handle crisis situation. Generally, these
results were based on the mean score of all study variables. Though
these results gave an overall picture of the findings, there were variations
in scores between organizations, based on their demographic
characteristics. Hence, further statistical analyses were required to
provide a complete and clearer understanding of this study.
Intercorrelations berween Variables
Correlation analysis provided an initial picture of the interrelationships
among the variables of interest. In this study, the Pearson Product-
Moment correlation coefficient (r) was used. Table 5 provided initial
indication that there was significant but negative relationship between
perception of loss due to abnormal risk and overall crisis preparedness.
On the other hand, there were low correlation between the other variables
of perception of risk and the organizational crisis preparedness. Even
then, further statistical tests were required to understand in greater detail.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
Perceived Possibility of Abnormal Loss 106 1.17 6.33 2.70 .90
Perceived Possibility of Normal Loss 106 1.25 6.00 3.09 1.04
Perceived Value of Abnormal Loss 106 1.00 7.00 4.35 1.51
Perceived Value of Normal Loss 106 1.25 7.00 4.70 1.42
Organizational Crisis Preparedness 106 2.33 6.81 5.25 .97
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mp1: Perception of Possible Loss due to Abnormal risk (IV)
mp2: Perception of Possible of Loss due to Normal Risk (IV)
mv1: Perception of Value of Possible Loss due to Abnormal Risk (IV)
mv2: Perception of Value of Possible Loss due to Normal Risk (IV)
ocp: Organizational Crisis Preparedness (DV)
Regression Analysis
Table 6 presents the results of the hierarchical regression analysis. To
test for the hypotheses, the Perception of possible loss and Perception
of value of possible loss were regressed on to the Organizational crisis
preparedness.
Table 5: Correlations between Variables
mp1 mp2 mv1 mv2 ocp
mp1 1.00
mp2 .43*** 1.00
mv1 .29** .05 1.00
mv2 .09 .13 .76*** 1.00
ocp -.34*** -.17 .08 .06 1.00
Note. ***significant at .01 **significant at .05
Table 6: Results of Regression analysis: Impact of Perception of risk and
Organizational crisis preparedness
Model 1 Model 2
Standardized Beta
Control Variables:
Years in business .08 .15
Organizational ownership .29*** .20*
Size of organization -.01 .02
Hazard Category .23* .24*
Model variables:
Perception of loss due to abnormal risk -.40**
Perception of loss due to normal risk .01
Perception of value of loss due to abnormal risk .22
Perception of value of loss due to normal risk -.11
R2 .15 .28
Adjusted R2 .11 .21
R2 Change .15 .13
F Change 4.33* 4.22*
Note *** significant at .01 *significant at .05
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Dummy coded variables: Hazard category: 0=non hazardous org.;
1=hazardous org.; Size of org: 0=500 employees and below; 1=above
500 employees; Ownership category: 0=50%-100% Malaysian
ownership; 1=100% foreign ownership and foreign majority, Years in
business: 0=15 yrs and below; 1=above 15 years.
Model 1 showed regression analysis with the control variables of
years in business, organizational ownership, organizational size and hazard
category on the dependent variable, overall crisis preparedness. The
model was significant with R2 = .15, Adjusted R2 = .11 and the F Value =
4.33. Upon examining the individual control variables, it was found that
the organizational ownership contributed significantly to this model, with
b = .29 (p<.01). The other significant variable was hazard category with
b = .23 (p<.05). As such, it was obvious that organizational ownership
and hazard category were significant contributors to the dependent
variable, organizational crisis preparedness.
In Model 2, the independent variables were included in the model
together with all the control variables. This model provided evidence of
direct relationship between independent and dependent variables after
statistically controlling for the four demographic variables. The model
improved significantly with R2 = .28, Adjusted R2 = .21, R2 Change = .13
and F Change = 4.22. Perception of possible loss due to abnormal risk
was significant with b = -.40 (p<.01). However, this variable was
negatively correlated.
Discussions
This study hypothesizes that organizational perception of risk will have
direct positive relationship with organizational crisis preparedness.
However, contrary to what is hypothesized, this study shows a negative
relationship between perception of possible loss due to abnormal risk
and organizational crisis preparedness and insignificant relationship
between perceived value of possible loss and organizational crisis
preparedness. These contradict what we see as natural for organizations
with low perception of risk to allocate little resources to prepare for
crisis potential and visa versa. This negative relationship provides evidence
that Malaysian manufacturing organizations perceived invulnerability to
risk because they believe that they are moderately crisis prepared. Studies
conducted in countries such as Hong Kong by Chong and Nyau (2002),
United States of America by Finks (1986) and United Kingdom by
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Wisenblit (1989) provided evidences of inconsistency between agreeing
on inevitability of crisis and having crisis plan which may help to explain
this phenomenon. Their studies found that more than 80% of the
organizations agree that crisis is inevitable but less than 50% of the
organizations have crisis plan. Likewise, this study also provides evidence
of inconsistencies. This study found that even though Malaysian
manufacturing organizations basically deny vulnerability to crisis; they
believed that they are quite crisis prepared. This is based on the mean
scores of the four dimensions of perception of risk which ranges from
2.70 to 4.70. Perception of possible loss has the lowest mean score
(2.70 and 3.09). This basically is translated into “disagree” and “slightly
disagree” (base on a 7 point-likert scale from (1) strongly disagree to (7)
strongly agree) that a loss may happen. It can therefore be concluded
that Malaysian manufacturing organizations basically deny vulnerability
to losses possibly because they think they are quite crisis prepared. The
mean scores on crisis preparedness range from 5.00 to 5.40 which
translate to “slightly agreeing” and “agreeing” that they are crisis
prepared. This result support Mitroff et al. (1996) argument that
executives and managers can develop too much faith (and a false sense
of security) in their abilities to prevent dangers when some level of crisis
preparation is adopted. This may bring us back to the Titanic disaster
(1912) when perception persists that the Titanic was “unsinkable” as
she was considered absolutely safe. To add to this Pearson and Clair
(1998) argues that “limited preparation actually may reinforce assumptions
of invulnerability” (p. 70).
To further substantiate this finding, it is worth recalling the Sungai
Buloh Bright Sparklers fire and explosion in 1991. This is a classic case of
a Malaysian manufacturing organization that refuses to learn from previous
mistakes and underestimate their risk and vulnerability to crisis. There
were four separate fatal accidents that happened since 1978 before the
tragedy that left 103 people dead in 1991. This organization did not heed
the warnings that brought about the tragedy after accumulation of errors
in a period estimated to be 16 years (Shaluf et al., 2002). Now, 14 years
after this dreadful tragedy, and many more recent tragedies such as fire
and explosion at Sultan Abdul Aziz International Airport (1991), Malaysian
oil and gas refinery explosion (1997), fatal accident in Proton Shah Alam
manufacturing plant (2002) and the recent gas leakage at Knowles
Electronic Industry in Penang (2005), Malaysian manufacturing
organizations still deny vulnerability to risk and crisis. Disasters that have
happened over the years in Malaysia and worldwide are perhaps considered
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rare happenings and isolated cases. As discussed earlier, the minimal level
of organizational crisis preparedness required by Malaysian regulatory
requirement reinforces their assumptions of invulnerability. Besides OSHA
(1994), various other legislations such as the Electricity Regulations (1994),
Employees’ Social Security Act (1969) and the latest being CIMAH
Regulations (1996) are implemented. Various government agencies are
established to enforce these legislations especially after the Bhopal disaster
(1984) and Bright Sparklers explosion (1991). For these reasons all
Malaysian manufacturing organizations with at least 40 employees are
subjected to some of these regulations. Needless to say, the hazardous
manufacturing organizations are subjected to more stringent regulations.
Despite many highly publicized disasters in Malaysia and worldwide,
it does not seem to influence the mindset of Malaysian manufacturing
organizations pertaining to their perception of risk. Their low perception
of vulnerability to risk and crises may lead us to believe that Malaysian
manufacturing organizations may not do more than what is required by
the law. If Malaysian manufacturing organizations do not perceive
vulnerability to crisis, than naturally they may not allocate resources to
prepare for crisis potentials. Malaysian manufacturing organizations must
seek to strike a balance between making profit and investment in
managing the adverse effect of manufacturing activities.
Though, ideally, greater crisis preparedness should be a natural
outcome of organizational beliefs and awareness of their vulnerabilities
to risk and crisis, this result provides evidence that is contrary to what
is hypothesized; perception of risk has no direct positive influence on
organizational concern for crisis and adoption of crisis management
preparedness. Even though the hypothesis is not supported, there is
reason to belief that this result may be peculiar to Malaysian
manufacturing organizations.
Conclusion
Crises and disasters are chaotic situations. As the magnitude and
impact of organizational crises continue to expand, many organizations
need to step back, to reassess the match between their greatest threats
and their crisis management abilities. In fact, this study allows
managers and executives to use the evidence from this empirical
research to assess their vulnerabilities to crises. Whilst no one can
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prevent all crises; let alone predict how, when, and where it will occur,
organizations can adopt a systematic and comprehensive perspective
for managing them more effectively. But perhaps the fundamental
issue underlying crisis preparedness is attitude and humility, rather
than conformity and arrogance.
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